BOUNDARY COMMISSION

THE ADEN BOUNDARY COMMISSION 1902-05

Part 1 – January 1902 to March 1903

Until the beginning of the 20th Century there was no agreed border between the British controlled Aden Protectorate and Turkish controlled Yemen. It all depended on allegiance. The Amiri were the most important border tribe under British protection and in 1899 the new Amir of Dthala (the contemporary spelling is used throughout this article) tried to expand his territory by collecting taxes from some tribes that had at one time been under the control of his predecessors but were currently paying taxes to the Turks. Two years later, in 1901, Turkish controlled tribesmen erected two forts near Al Dareja in Haushabi country to the West of Dthala, the Haushabi being another of the protected tribes. The British and Turkish governments therefore agreed in early November 1901 that a Joint Boundary Commission should be set up to agree and demarcate the border between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.

The Aden Resident, Major General Maitland, had himself been a member of the Afghan Boundary Commission in 1884-86 and he was adamant that a full survey of the border area would be necessary, with the production of maps at a scale of one inch to the mile. For their part the Turks were quick to appoint a Colonel as their Commissioner and the British looked around for a suitable officer of similar rank. The obvious choice was Colonel Wahab, a survey specialist who in 1891-92 as a Captain had attempted to survey the border area to the West of Dthala. Wahab was on his way back to India after leave in the UK and the order was given for him to disembark at Aden and assume the appointment of British Commissioner.

By mid-January 1902 the British commission was ready to set out for Dthala. Apart from Wahab there were five other British officers and one civilian. A survey party had been sent from India and an escort of 72 men was found from the roulement Indian Army battalion in Aden. Six mounted infantry from the Aden Troop and 17 Indian Army sappers completed the military detachment. The five other officers were Lieutenant Colonel Abud, an experienced Aden hand who was appointed Deputy Commissioner, the survey officer Lieutenant Tandy, an intelligence officer Major Tod, a medical officer Captain Thompson and Major Doveton who commanded the escort. The civilian was G Wyman Bury who was officially there as naturalist to the commission, but having ‘gone native’ was the best Arabic speaker in Aden and also someone who knew the area well from previous intelligence work in the hinterland. The party arrived in Dthala on 26 January, nearly a fortnight before the Turkish commission arrived at to establish their camp at Al Jalela, the Turks not having travelled during Ramadan.

Wahab’s first priority was to establish which tribes historically owed allegiance to the Amir and over the next five weeks he examined the Amir’s accounts and interviewed as many of the chiefs as possible. His main concern was that the Turks were holding the Jalela feature which dominated the route down to Aden. The two camps were about four miles apart and on 8 February Wahab informed Colonel Remzi, his opposite number, that he was proposing to move the British camp closer to the Turkish camp. Remzi’s reply was a foretaste of difficult times ahead: the move was not ‘convenient’ as according to the Turks the location was not within British limits.

The sketch map below helps one understand the differences between what the two parties were claiming. The Turks were claiming a salient that ran SSE from Kataba, roughly two to three miles wide and running parallel to the caravan route through Al Jalela to the Jalela feature at the head of the Kareba Pass. This salient was relatively flat and fertile.

The first formal meeting of the Commission was held on the 11th and both sides agreed that work should begin to the East of Kataba. Wahab reported that this meeting was extremely cordial, influenced perhaps by the fact that the Turks proposed that he should be Chairman. The Turks stated that their remit was to define the boundary between the province of Taiz and the ‘Nine Tribes’ (these being the nine tribes in the British Protectorate). This was not necessarily going to be identical to the British aim, which was to settle the northwest boundaries of the British protectorate in South Arabia.

Nothing much was discussed at the 2nd formal meeting on 3 March and at the next meeting two days later Wahab handed over 30 sets of documents, 21 of which were historical and the remainder sets of annual accounts. These documents were to become the basis of British claims in the disputed areas. Turkish detachments were based in several locations claimed by Wahab, in particular on the Jebel Jihaf. The 4th meeting was held on 8 March and the next a week later. As a result of the British claims the Turkish position hardened considerably, to the extent that the Turks could not even agree as to which were the nine tribes under British protection. As early as the end of February Maitland had warned India that there were problems ahead. So much so that the next formal meeting would not take place until November. The British commission remained at Dthala to take advantage of the benign climate compared to that of Aden.

The work of the Joint Commission was to be in three distinct phases for each section of the border. A joint survey of the likely border area would be followed by political agreement as to which tribes should be either side of the border, and finally joint marking out of the border by the erection of boundary markers. That summer little could be done apart from getting to know the terrain. Little surveying was possible due to not knowing where the border was likely to be. For his part it was not until 9 April that Wahab was able to confirm to Maitland that he now knew exactly the limits of the Amir’s area. Given the Turkish attitude Maitland more than doubled the escort to 180 infantry and 22 mounted infantry. He also set in train contingency planning for the formation in Aden of a moveable column.

At the end of July at an informal meeting of the Joint Commission the Turks were invited to begin demarcation of the northeast sector around Behan, leaving the more contentious Dthala sector for later; the Turks declined, saying their commission had no orders regarding the northeast. The next day the Turks informed Wahab that they did not recognise the Yaffa, the largest tribe in the northeast, as being on their list of ‘Nine Tribes’. At the end of September Wahab received a telegram from the Secretary of State for India that the Turks had ordered the evacuation of their posts in the disputed area and that the Yaffa were after all on the Turkish list. More importantly the Turks were ready to begin demarcation up to the Wadi Bana. Turkish communications were somewhat slower and a month later no new instructions had yet been received by Remzi. Therefore in early November Maitland advised India that it was doubtful if the Turks would withdraw from their positions without a show of force. His biggest problem would be the hiring or purchase of sufficient camels to carry the necessary supplies that a mobile column would require. He could hire or buy 500 within a week but it would take another four to six weeks to assemble the remaining 2,000 that might be needed. To save money he did not want to obtain any camels until the raising of a column had been authorised. He suggested that if the Turks had not withdrawn by 15 November the hiring of camels should begin as the season for military operations was a short one.

That same day as Maitland was telegraphing India, Wahab was informed by Remzi that he had orders to withdraw from some areas, including the Jihaf, but had received no orders regarding the Yaffa. Remzi also suggested a formal meeting the following day, 7 November, at the end of which Wahab was able to report that it was evident that the attitude of the Turkish commission had changed completely. However on 10 November Wahab reported that the previous night Turkish patrols had come within a mile of the British camp and had also patrolled to the head of the Kareba Pass, the most vulnerable section of the line of communication back to Aden. Wahab concluded that to ensure the Turks carried out their promised withdrawal it would be necessary to match the size of the Turkish forces in the border area, about 400 infantry and four or five guns. He recommended that part of the force should consist of British troops and the moveable column be mobilised and a portion sent to Dthala, with the main body being kept at Musemir or some place in the Tiban valley where there were ample water supplies.

Two more formal meetings were held in November, at the beginning of which month Abud had been replaced by Mr Fitzmaurice who had come from the British Embassy in Constantinople where he was 3rd Dragoman. As such he was a fluent Turkish speaker and the intention was that he would be the British negotiator in future meetings. Whereas Abud had been Deputy Commissioner, for status purposes Fitzmaurice was appointed Joint Commissioner (and Wahab henceforth referred to as ‘Senior Joint Commissioner’). In early December Maitland left for India for the Durbar, as did the Amir of Dthala, escorted by Abud. Lieutenant Colonel Ashby became Acting Resident. On 11 December India authorised the sending of a column of 400 men and a battery of four guns to Dthala. Since the artillery in Aden was unsuitable for mobile operations a mountain battery was to be sent from India.

On 29 December Ashby issued a rather unsatisfactory set of orders to the commander of the column. Its task was to garrison Dthala in the absence of the Boundary Commission and under normal circumstances it was not to move from Dthala without reference to the Resident. However in an emergency the officer commanding was to comply with any order Wahab might give him, or in Wahab’s absence act on his own initiative. There was to be no offensive movement against the Turks or any tribes without the express sanction of Government (i.e. India). The role of the column was essentially defensive, but in the event that the Turks or their levies attempted to occupy any place within an area agreed to be British, they were to be opposed.

This is an apt moment to mention communications between Dthala and Aden. Since deployment in January 1902 a two-way system of camel-borne postal runners carried mail daily to and from Dthala. Eight runners were employed to a timetable which allowed each runner to remain within his own tribal area by working the same ‘up’ and ‘down’ stage, covering on average about 11 miles in each direction every day. Runners did not move at night and the timetable allowed mail to get to Dthala in 25 hours and back to Aden in 38. Equally pertinent was the time needed to get a reply to a query. Four days to get a reply from Wahab and at best two and a half to get a reply from the Residency. In theory Wahab could also get a cabled reply from India in four and a half days. This postal schedule was adequate for routine matters and whilst the Commission remained in camp near Dthala. But once deployed a quicker means of communication would be needed in the event of an emergency. There were two possibilities: signalling by heliograph or lamp or a telegraph line. In clear visibility (most likely soon after first light) a heliograph link worked quite well, either directly from Sham Sham to a signalling station on Dthubiyat (and from there relayed to the camp outside Dthala) or via a relay station at Chakka, some miles South of Nobat Dakim, which place could also raise Sham Sham on occasions. But this was hardly the belt to the braces of the postal runners so when the column was mobilised it was also decided, at considerable expense of installation but even greater of running costs, to construct a telegraph line from the Residency at Steamer Point to Dthala. A key factor was that the Turks had a telegraph line from their Commission to Sanaa.

Ramadan finished on 30 December and three days later the Aden Column left for Dthala. The first elements arrived on the 10th and camped just North of Dthala town and to the South of the commission camp. The arrival of the column brought the total strength at Dthala to 700 men, including 225 British infantry, which matched the Turks who had forces estimated as 300 at Kataba and 400 with four guns at Jalela.

Remzi finally received his new orders on 21 January. The Yaffa was one of the Nine Tribes and demarcation could begin in a northeasterly direction from Kataba. The Turks were warned not to increase the size of their escort beyond the 200 mark, nor to reoccupy any of the disputed areas. During the second half of February Wahab carried out three patrols in strength (125 to 300 men on each) to check that the Turkish forces had actually withdrawn from the disputed areas, after which he informed the Turks that this verification had been completed to his satisfaction. On 22 March the Turks completed the withdrawal of their commission camp from Jalela to Kataba and a week later Wahab began moving his camp just North of the now vacated Turkish customs post at Sanah, which was only one mile from the Turkish camp at Kataba. After 14 months of virtual inactivity work was about to begin in earnest.

Part 2 - April 1903 to January 1904

On 2 April 1903 a joint survey was begun in the Kataba area. Wahab’s new camp was nine miles from Dthala and towards the end of April 200 infantry and two guns from the Aden Column set up a new camp alongside that of the Commission. This detachment became the Supporting Column to the Commission with orders to always be within 24 hours of the Commission when the latter was on the move. In addition one-third of the main Aden Column was kept at relatively short notice to move in the event of an emergency.

Meanwhile some of the tribes astride the British line of communication had been giving trouble, so much so that the Royal Dublin Fusiliers had been retained in Aden when the Hampshires had arrived to relieve them. It was to be another nine months before the Dublins could be released. Maitland recommended to India that he would need to deploy an additional 1,100 troops into the Dthala area and that he would need reinforcements from India of an Indian infantry battalion, half of a British battalion ( a ‘wing’) and a British mountain battery (the one already in Aden being Indian). The reinforcements were all agreed and sent without delay. In mid-March a section of a British field hospital arrived at Nobat Dakim, the same convoy bringing up two sections of an Indian field hospital to Dthala. Early in May extra logistics staff would arrive from India for service in the hinterland. With only a handful of logisticians ever in the hinterland the resupply system worked surprisingly well.

On 16 May the ‘rapid reaction force’ of the Aden Column, at the time referred to as a ‘flying column’, was deployed to follow-up tribesmen who had removed 300 yards of telegraph wire near Hardaba, between Dthala and Sulek. The force followed the tribesmen to the village of Dthabra, well inside the Wadi Taym. The village and its towers were destroyed and the force was back in Dthala on 25 May. The Political Officer with this column, the man who made the non-tactical decisions, was Captain Warneford - an officer supposedly with a bright future.

For several months ill-feeling had been building up between Maitland and Wahab. The problems were twofold: one concerned the chain of command and the other, connected to the first, was that Wahab was operating in Maitland’s patch. Regarding the latter problem, in mid-May India informed Maitland that Wahab should (i.e. must) be guided by the former’s advice as it was the Resident who controlled the tribes and would have to make the arrangements now being made function in the future. Maitland was told to pass these orders on to Wahab. The chain of command was that Wahab was only authorised to communicate directly with India on matters of a technical nature. All other material had to be sent via Maitland. Wahab was unhappy that there were unnecessary delays in passing his non-technical requests and reports on to India. Maitland was unhappy because of the continued delays in demarcation, which latterly were partly of Wahab’s making. Maitland was having to provide the considerable logistical and operational support required for the hinterland with what amounted to a very lightweight brigade headquarters and a limited budget. Perhaps most importantly they disagreed as which areas should be the priority for demarcation.

Their divergence of views came to a head on 6 June when Wahab, using the telegraph line from Dthala to the Residency, sent a very long telegram via Maitland to the Government of India in which he was critical of Maitland’s plan and put forward his own timetable. Maitland was furious and wired back to Wahab that a letter would have been just as effective and would save the £200 or more that the telegram would cost to send to India by cable. In the meantime Maitland was withholding the telegram. As can be imagined Wahab was equally unhappy and asked for the original telegram to be sent without further delay, with its original date of despatch and with an additional piece at the end to avoid the necessity of sending a second telegram. This was to the effect that confusion regarding the northeast might have been avoided if there had been more direct communication between Government and the Commission regarding the latter’s work. Or in other words if Wahab was allowed to deal directly with India. Wahab justified the cost of the telegram, equal to the cost of keeping the Commission in the field for one day, by the fact that it might reduce by several months the duration of the Commission.

In July they were both still jockeying for position. Maitland was infuriated by another of Wahab’s telegrams to India in which the latter said he suspected the Resident as having detained or suppressed other telegrams and that as a result important decisions on boundary questions might be made against Wahab’s advice. The Commission could not accept responsibility unless this was put a stop to. This upset Maitland not a little but his explanations for the delays in forwarding telegrams were not believed and in due course would bring censure from India. To bypass Maitland Wahab followed up this telegram with a long letter of complaint to Calcutta. On 9 August Wahab won the battle if not the war when Calcutta informed Maitland that to save a mail (i.e. a delay of a week) the Commission in future could forward important despatches (by telegram or letter) direct to India, but with copies to the Resident, the India Office in London and the British Embassy in Constantinople. In case of necessity the Resident could communicate his opinion by telegram, having presumably seen his copy before other addressees had received theirs. On 11 August Maitland reacted in puerile fashion to this arrangement. Wahab had sent a telegram direct to India which merited an opinion by Maitland. Instead he made what in Simla was described as an extremely foolish comment. Maitland’s telegram brought a sharp response from one of the information addressees - the India Office in London. In short the Secretary of State would replace one or both the officers concerned if they did not sort out their differences. Maitland was ordered to communicate the contents of this telegram to Wahab and the former set off for Dthala as soon as he was able in order to make his peace with Wahab.

Maitland visited Wahab on 22 August when they discussed arrangements for escorting survey parties for the survey up to the Wadi Bana. Maitland suggested that he should be responsible for escorting them and that Captain Warneford should be in political charge. The Resident decided to remain at Dthala for the time being and on 24 August Wahab accepted Maitland’s plan and offered Tandy to be in charge of the overall survey which was due to start work on 31 August. The main base for the survey would be near Awabil, which was on a high plateau 13 miles northeast of Dthala. From this plateau it would be possible to have line-of-sight to both the camp in Dthala (possibly via Dthubiyat) and to the survey party and its escort at Rubiaten on the Wadi Bana.

With the Commission and its escort on the move it was now necessary for the Supporting Column to shadow them within a day’s march. Problems were soon encountered, not with the Turks but with local tribes who imagined that the survey work was a precursor to increased taxes. On 4 September in a skirmish four miles East of Awabil one of the two Assistant Surveyors was shot and killed, in spite of his having a 50-man escort. On hearing the firing Warneford took another 50 men from Awabil to investigate and, as was normal practice, subsequently ordered the village concerned to be razed to the ground. On hearing of this incident Maitland sent another 100 men from Dthala to Awabil, together with Fitzmaurice and Major Redl, who had replaced Tod as intelligence officer. Two days later he sent another 200 men and two guns to Awabil. When they arrived there the force at Awabil was split, with Tandy and a survey party moving to Rubiaten on the Wadi Bana, with an escort commanded by Delamain and a second supporting column under Captain Sherwell. Warneford as Political Officer was controlling this deployment.

On 12 September Maitland, still at Dthala and whilst dining with his ADC and Bury, received a report from Warneford that he had heard that a dissident tribal chief, Sheikh Saleh, with 1,000 men was advancing towards Rubiaten where the survey party was working. Maitland then set out himself at first light the next morning for Awabil with a further 300 men, mainly Royal Dublin Fusiliers, together with the remaining four guns of 6 Mountain Battery, leaving Colonel Scallon, the commander of the Aden Column, with the remainder of the rapidly diminishing garrison at Dthala. On arrival at Awabil on the morning of the 14thhe found that the garrison there had been attacked the previous morning by part of Saleh’s force, estimated at 500 rifles. Saleh’s losses were estimated at 20 dead and 40 wounded. The Awabil position was quite a strong one but a group of attackers had got to within 200 yards and then put enfilade fire into the sector of the defences held by the Hampshires whose casualties were one dead and four wounded.

Warneford’s force finished their survey work on the 15th, following which all the various detachments returned to their camps at Sanah and Dthala. On the 21stWahab was able to inform Maitland that the Turks had more or less agreed to what would be the line of the border in Haushabi country. A week later the Resident left for Aden and on 11 October the first boundary pillars were erected east of Sanah. A few days later Wahab was able to report that demarcation had been completed from the Wadi Bana to a point near Al Ukla.

Meanwhile the survey parties had been working on another sector of the border, with an excellent level of cooperation between the two halves of the joint commission. Both were in the same boat, in that they would have to live in tented camps until the job was completed. Wahab and Remzi had already been in the field for over 18 months. As an example of cooperation Tandy and Fitzmaurice had moved to the Mares area on 7 October, with an escort provided by the Turks as due to the inhospitable terrain the border could only be reached from the Turkish side. On the 24th Wahab was informed that the Turks had more or less accepted the line of the border in the Dakkam area and that the joint survey there could now commence. Joint even to the extent that a joint camp would be established at Masharah. Not for the first time there was now a distraction away from the border area.

On 28 October a major outpost on the line of communication, at Sulek and on the edge of the Radfan, was reported as having been under attack for two days. Wahab postponed the move of the commission to Masharah, sending only the survey element. A column including four guns was sent from Dthala to reinforce Sulek. As it happened the Hampshires were on their way back up to Dthala after a spell in Aden and had left their camp on the isthmus on the 27th. Early on the 29th they received orders to push on at best speed and managed to cover 23 miles in one day, which was double the normal distance in that heat. Following this incident the strength of the post at Sulek was doubled to 150 men.

On 8 November India telegraphed Maitland to express disquiet about reports of increased operational activity. The Resident only received this telegram on the 14th as he was on the move in the Radfan. He replied that operations had been forced on him by the Kotaibi who had shot and killed the two mounted infantry who were escorting the mail runner and had then attacked the fort at Sulek so persistently that he had been forced to send a column to relieve it. He then warned India that the demarcation of the Subaihi border in the southwest could be a potential problem. This aggressive tribe, due to its isolated location had long acted with immunity and the demarcation of this area of the border would require the greatest care and firmness. A month previously Maitland had warned India that he was running out of reserves and he now asked for an immediate reinforcement of another wing (half-battalion) of Indian troops.

Meanwhile the Commission had continued to make progress. On 6 November the Commission’s camp was moved to Mariah in the Wadi Tiban. By the 11th the survey of the Tiban had been completed as far as Jebel Sarir and two days later Tandy moved with the Turkish surveyors to survey the Jebel Haska, another area only accessible from the Turkish side. However with Ramadan due to begin on the 20th, on the 15th the Turkish Commission returned to Kataba, Wahab and Fitzmaurice returning to Sanah the same day. Some survey work continued during Ramadan. On the 30th one of Tandy’s Assistants, with a Turkish escort, reached the Haushabi border West of the Tiban.

Early in December the joint commission moved to Ukla to agree the boundary in the area of Jebel Barkan. In another example of continued cooperation on 14 December Wahab offered to provide an escort for the Turkish commission down to the Haushabi border in the event that the Turks didn’t have enough troops to provide their own escort as well as guarding their camp at Kataba - the garrison there having been reduced due to increasing unrest elsewhere in the Yemen, which would eventually break into civil war. Although it would take another month to complete demarcation down to the Haushabi border, also on the 14thWahab hired a further 140 camels that would be needed for the next phase, the survey and demarcation down to the coast. An advance party was sent to try to improve the track at the North end of the Tiban gorge so that it could be used by laden camels. On the 18th the Commission moved camp to Tusan, 13 miles NNW of Musemir and 15 miles SW of Dthala.

On 13 January the Joint Commission met to agree on the section of border in Haushabi country and ten days later Wahab was able to report that 34 out of 40 miles of border in that area had been agreed, with maps being signed up the following day as far as Jebel Jalisa. However there now followed a four day delay in moving camps as the Turkish deputy was seriously ill, the new British MO visiting him daily. Survey parties continued to work and Wahab lent the Turks 50 camels and also allowed them to use tracks on the British side of the border. Wahab recorded that the Turks were having trouble with some of their local chiefs who were suspicious that the survey was a cover to get tax collectors into the area.

This had been a very successful nine and a half months with the most important part of the border having been finished, largely due to the excellent joint co-operation between the two commissions. There remained the Subaihi border, which was to present particular problems of its own.

Part 3 - February 1904 – April 1905

Whilst the Haushabi border was being demarcated much planning and preparation had been going on for the move into the Subaihi section of the border. This area was going to be difficult for several reasons: first there was the total absence of any surface water and the lack of sufficient wells; secondly, as the area of operations moved towards the coast and away from the mountains, combined with the onset of the hot weather season, daytime temperatures would become difficult to bear; thirdly at least one new line of communication back to Aden would be required; fourthly the Subaihi had a bad reputation. Wahab had had trouble there during his survey work in 1891-92 and the Subaihi did not reckon on owing allegiance to anyone. They had a reputation for trickery and not for nothing were they known as the ‘children of the dawn’ for their propensity for dawn attacks on the unwary. How were these problems to be mitigated or overcome?

Although the Commission had been living under canvas one can imagine that the officers would have still lived in some style. Wahab decided that it would have to travel on light scales and on 12 January all non-essential camp stores and other equipment were sent back to Aden. At the same time, to reduce the requirement for forage for his horses and mules, he also sent back 51 of the 63 mules which he had retained when the Indian mountain battery had been sent back to India in May the previous year. In addition Wahab requested that the 12 horse-mounted sowars from the Aden Troop be replaced with camel-mounted sowars, the Troop having equal numbers of both on its establishment. The day prior to the move across the Subaihi border on 6 February Wahab halved the daily water ration to one and a half gallons per man per day for all uses and allocated 21 of his camels for carrying a reserve of water. The combination of terrain and climate had however produced one bonus. Few tribesmen lived in the border area and the terrain was very infertile and with the exception of the section near the coast the Turks would be pretty indifferent as to the line of the border. On Christmas Eve Wahab had been able to inform India that the Turks had agreed to the survey of the Subaihi border being done on a reduced scale of map (two miles to the inch, instead of one).

The first new line of communication was set up from Nobat Dakim through Musemir. There was already a small outpost near Musemir, a relic from the Ad Daraja expedition of 1901 to destroy the two Turkish forts mentioned earlier. Wahab had moved his camp (still on full scales) there on 24 December and on to Ad Dareja on Christmas Day. But the Subaihi border ran in a southwesterly direction and the L of C through Musemir would soon become redundant as far as the Commission was concerned, requiring another to be established through Am Rija via Sheikh Othman. But the Nobat to Musemir section would still be needed to resupply the Aden Column which arrived at Musemir on 13 January. On 21 January, still over a fortnight before the move into Subaihi territory was due to commence, Wahab had the foresight to suggest to Maitland that in due course the L of C for the Commission itself should be changed to being via Ras Ara on the coast, about five miles East of Hiswa, with supplies being sent by sea from Aden to Ras Ara.

Wahab’s route into Subaihi country would be over the Minjara Pass, some 10 miles SSW of Musemir, he having been advised by a visiting Subaihi chief that this was the only practicable route when approaching from the North. One must not forget that Wahab was working in Maitland’s ‘patch’ and it was the latter who determined the deployment and force levels required to support the Commission. On 14 January Maitland informed India of his plans. His aim was to overawe the Subaihi with the threat of an attack in force from more than one direction. The Sultan of Lahej’ s view was that this aim was being achieved and that as long as the threat was maintained the Subaihi would not obstruct the passage of the Commission to any great extent.

The infantry units at Maitland’s disposal were 950 Buffs, 450 Hampshires (the other half of the battalion having been sent to British Somaliland) and two Indian battalions each about 700 strong, altogether a total of about 2,800 men. The defence of Aden itself and guard duties there required a minimum of 500 men and the protection of a not yet fully expanded L of C at least 400 more. Now that the Aden Column had left Dthala a garrison of about 400 was still needed there. This left Maitland with about 1,400 men to deploy in the southwest. On 16 January he informed India that the Aden Column at Musemir now consisted of 800 infantry, including 450 of the Hampshires, 6 (British) Mountain Battery and 20 camel sowars of the Aden Troop. Half of this force was kept at a short notice to provide a ‘flying column’. The escort with the Commission was 150 infantry, plus a few sappers and camel sowars. 450 infantry, including 300 men of the Buffs, recently arrived in Aden, were ready to move out from Aden via Am Rija to Dar-al-Kudaimi, some 12 miles WNW of Am Rija.

Fortunately by this time Maitland had been promised another wing (half-battalion) from India. These and all remaining available troops, would be needed to secure the Ls of C. If necessary Maitland estimated that the Sultan of Lahej could provide a force of about 200 mounted horsemen or camelmen. This would in effect be his only reserve. He again stressed the need to maintain the threat of prompt attack on the Subaihi. Wahab on the other hand expressed his opinion that this show of force might be counter-productive. There were the makings of another set-to between these two officers and in Bombay the thought was that Wahab, after his experience of the Subaihi in 1891-92, really ought to trust Maitland’s judgement and attend to his own business. The parties concerned in Aden were told by Bombay that all arrangements with the tribes must be left to the discretion of the Resident.

Soon after the Aden Column reached Musemir it was visited by Delamain (still commanding the Commission’s close escort) to liaise concerning the impending move to the southwest. It was considered expedient for the commission to have some artillery of its own, so two guns from 6 Battery were detached. However standing operational procedures demanded that British artillery had to have a British infantry escort. This was provided by 40 men from the Hampshires, with one maxim. In early February the commission moved camp to Karash, from where final preparations were made for the move into Subaihi territory.

The next problem was that the Aden Column in Musemir, due to the difficulty of the terrain, would be two days march from the commission and therefore unable to provide the timely response required as a supporting column. A 'flying column' of 400 men, under command of Major de Winton of the Hampshires, was sent therefore to the Minjara Pass to cover the move of the Commission through the pass and then to remain there to provide the supporting column. Wahab’s party numbered about 275 men, this being the maximum number it was estimated could be replenished with water from wells in the area to be traversed. For the same reason it was decided that de Winton’s column would not move further South except in an emergency.

As a result of good planning a new Supporting Column was to hand. The detachment from Aden, mainly Buffs and under the command of Major Ravenhill of that Regiment, now down to 350 men having dropped 100 off at Am Rija to secure this L of C, arrived at Dar-al-Kudaimi on 8 February, only five miles from where the commission was now encamped. Since leaving Minjara Wahab had found very little well water and he had none to give to the 350 transport camels with the Commission. The next day the new supporting column heard the sound of the guns with the Commission being fired. It had been fired on from a village but did not require assistance. As a precaution de Winton’s column was ordered to remain at Minjara for the time being. A company of Indian infantry arrived from Aden at Am Rija on the 14th, thus allowing the 100 men to rejoin Ravenhill's column. The CO of the Hampshires, Lieutenant Colonel Buckley, was still at Musemir with half of his original Aden Column. With him in political control was Warneford, whilst Bury had the same function alongside Ravenhill. On 13 February Maitland sent an officer in the station ship to do a reconnaissance of landing and water facilities at Ras Ara.

Two days later Wahab was again complaining about the unnecessary strength of the force backing up the Commission. From now on the availability of water would be the limiting factor, not the need to overawe the Subaihi. On the 16thWahab asked Ravenhill to send 300 infantry and two guns to join him in the Wadi Madin, where there was an abundant supply of water. The next day Maitland informed India he was sending out another 150 men to hold posts to the rear of Ravenhill’s column.

All this increased operational activity had caught the eye of the politicians in London. With a view to answering a question in Parliament, on 18 February the Secretary of State for India cabled Maitland asking him to provide details of the composition of troops deployed in the hinterland, and also the number of casualties since January 1902 when the Commission had moved to Dthala. The timing of this request was fortuitous as in the absence of location states it is the only complete state on record, and that within a few days of the maximum numbers deployed. The state was sent by return on 19 February, but would appear to have been the deployment on about the 13th. The location state is at Annex A. Numbers of artillery personnel have been estimated, as the original state only mentions the number of guns. The casualty return took a week to prepare, and even then its accuracy was not guaranteed.

The wounded amounted to between 30 and 40, including one British officer. In addition a considerable number of men had been invalided. As an example of the latter on 24 October 1903, after only eight months in Aden, about 15% of the Hampshires were invalided back to England. Dysentry was the main killer, for example six men of the Hampshires succumbing within a six week period in May/June 1903. Malaria, although seldom a killer when treated with quinine, was the chief incapacitator. Nobat Dakim and Musemir were particularly bad locations for malaria, due to the camps being close to mosquito breeding grounds. It might seem strange that only one British officer was a casualty, (the OC at Sulek being seriously wounded when the outpost had been attacked in October 1903). But there were not many British officers serving in Aden. Indian battalions had only six or seven and even the Hampshires had only nine in the hinterland.

In spite of the number of ‘battle casualties’ that had been incurred the reply to the parliamentary question mentioned above included the sentence ‘there have been no military operations in the Aden hinterland’. This was not well received by those on the ground! It was also probably the main reason why no campaign medal was ever issued, although subsequent lobbying would lead to an entry in the service records of those concerned that they had been on active service. A few gallantry medals were awarded, including a DSO to the OC of the rearguard (a future Aden Resident) and a DCM to one of his junior NCOs, both Hampshires, during the withdrawal from the punitive expedition into the Radfan October-November 1903, when the company forming the rearguard had had one soldier killed and another eight wounded.

That part of the original Aden Column, mostly Hampshires, that had remained at Musemir had become redundant by mid-February. The main body of this regiment arrived back in Aden on 28 February. Bury, the Political officer with Ravenhill, had been made an Extra Assistant Resident the year before and with the return of the Aden Column to Aden Wameford as a professional Assistant was ordered to proceed to Ravenhill’s camp to take over from Bury as Political Officer. At Am Rija Warneford was shot and killed by one of the six men of his close escort. Maitland then sent out Davies, his 1st Assistant, to take over from Bury. Davies was to remain with Ravenhill until this column was recalled at the end of April.

On 6 March Maitland suggested to Wahab that when the Commission reached Turan, some 11 miles North of Ras Ara, the supporting column could be withdrawn and that Wahab hand over to Fitzmaurice, who would then finish the remainder of the border down to Turba. Wahab quite correctly foresaw problems ahead and elected to remain to see the job done as far as the coast. India asked Maitland on 9 March if he was ready to release the Hampshires and if he wanted to retain 6 Mountain Battery. He replied that the situation should allow the Hampshires to leave at about the end of April. He would liked to have retained 6 Battery but this unit had suffered particularly badly from malaria and should leave as soon as possible. He would however like to retain one section for the time being.

Wahab’s water problems worsened by the week. Wherever temporary camps were set up there was usually only a single well and this of limited capacity. On 8 April 139 camel drivers, fearful of the conditions ahead, deserted with their camels, although some were rounded up. On the 10th with survey parties suffering from dehydration, Wahab ordered that in future a camel with a load of water should accompany each party. On the 11th a large proportion of the British detachment were reported as suffering from heat exhaustion. The intelligence officer, Redl, and the MO were sent out to examine wells in the neighbourhood. Even when good wells were found it was increasingly evident that a large body of troops soon exhausted what had initially seemed to be a plentiful supply. This did nothing to improve relations with the local tribesmen. In an attempt to alleviate the problems of lack of water and heat exhaustion, on 11 April Wahab ordered Ravenhill to send 300 men to Turan.

Everyone in excess of that number, plus his remaining two guns, were to return to Aden via Am Rija. Maitland countermanded both parts of this order. The supporting column must remain within one day’s march of the commission and the guns, because of the problems with heat exhaustion must be taken out via Ras Ara. He also insisted that posts on the L of C via Am Rija must not be withdrawn until the new L of C via Ras Ara was operational. He also put pressure on Wahab to complete all commission work down to the coast. He was determined to have the Buffs return to Aden before the onset of the hottest weather and gave 30 April as the cut-off date for their remaining under canvas.

On the 13th with the British gunners and the escort to the maxim (the 70 British soldiers with the Commission) showing signs of being affected by the excessive heat, Wahab arranged to dispense with all British troops with the escort, except for one gun crew. But Maitland was again furious with Wahab for giving orders to troops that were not under his direct command and felt it necessary to express his views in a ‘clear the line’ telegram to Wahab. But he had also got the message about heat exhaustion and telegraphed India that he hoped the withdrawal of the Hampshires and 6 Battery from Aden would not be delayed as the health of both units was bad and not improving. On the 18th Maitland informed Simla that all British troops with Ravenhill (Buffs) would be embarked at Ras Ara on the 23rd. He also suggested to Wahab that the detachment of Hampshires with its two guns be embarked on the 27th, warning that the retention of British soldiers near the coast was in his opinion risking serious loss of life. Wahab took the decision to bring forward the embarkation of the Hampshires also to the 23rd, thus leaving only 330 Indian soldiers in the field, split more or less as Maitland had suggested ten days or so earlier. On the 28th India was informed that the supporting column had officially ceased to exist.

The only line of communication now operating was that via Ras Ara, with the station ship making one round trip each week. On the 24th the joint commission was only as far as the area of Mudariba, to the West of which there was a portion of disputed border. There was a large tract that belonged to the Subaihi but which had been paying taxes to the Turks. The latter warned that they were not willing to continue to cooperate if there was to be any alteration to their draft, which had their proposed border marked by a red line on the map, as opposed to the purple line on Wahab’s map. The Turkish commission had evidently had enough of living rough as on the 29 April they announced that they intended moving their commission to their fort at Turba, on the coast. In India it was realised that an impasse had been reached but Bombay saw no reason why Wahab should give in to Turkish demands and that he should continue to demarcate on the basis of the purple line.

The Turkish commission moved to Turba on 15 May. Although delimitation had been completed only as far as Mudariba Wahab decided to ask the Resident to transfer the Commission less its escort to Perim. This was done on the night of21-22 May, the escort being shipped back to Aden in two halves over the next three days. With quite a lot of survey work still to be completed before delimitation of the final stretch could be agreed with the Turks, survey parties were soon sent back to the border from Perim and by 31 May they had completed their work up as far as Akama and Akkar, i.e. to the actual limit of Subaihi territory. At that point the Turks objected to survey parties entering the military zone around Turba.

On 4 June Fitzmaurice was ordered to remain at Perim until maps had been exchanged with the Turks. This was expected to take about four weeks, but in the event he would have to remain on Perim another 11 months. The others fared considerably better. On the 6th Wahab was told he could send the survey parties back to India and the next day he received the news he personally had been waiting for: he could leave forthwith. He wrote to Maitland that the last three months had just about finished him and he thought he would never be fit to work again. (He would retire from the Army the following year, aged only 50.) In Bombay it was appreciated that Wahab had done an excellent job, for which he had not received the credit he deserved, due to his services being understated and at times deprecated by Maitland.

The field part of the Joint Commission’s task was now virtually complete. Most of the negotiating over the next 10 months would be done by the British Ambassador in Constantinople, to agree the line of border for the final few miles down to the coast and also to negotiate the border East of the Wadi Bana. By April 1905 all parties had had enough. For the Turks there was the added diversion of a major civil war in the Yemen that had begun in earnest back in December 1904. On 15 April 1905 it was proposed that in the northeast the boundary would be on a true bearing NE from the last pillar that had been erected near Harib. This proposal was soon accepted. The compass bearing was described as defining the dividing line of the sphere of influence between Britain and Turkey, as opposed to a border. It was mainly desert, anyway. On 30 April Fitzmaurice reported that three pillars had been erected on the coast to the east of Turba and that he would be leaving Perim for Aden that evening. He would return to the Embassy at Constantinople with well-earned promotion to 2nd Dragoman.

Administrative and logistic sub-units were not included in the return, nor were camp followers. With 5,000 camels being used by the Supplies and Transport Branch with units, but more particularly on the lines of communication, the number of camp followers would have been considerable.

To arrive at the maximum deployment one must add the 100 men sent out to Am Rija. (Their non-inclusion dates the return as being as at about 13 February). Not included either are the extra 150 men Maitland on the 17th said he was sending out to man posts on the new L of C; there is no record that these were ever actually deployed. The maximum deployment, not counting Services and camp followers was therefore around 2,500, a not inconsiderable total given the spread out deployment needing three lines of communication and the consequent difficulties of resupply.

The Border in the Subaihi Tribal Area

When the Turkish Commission moved down to Sheikh Syed on 15 May 1903 the border had only been agreed as far as Mudariba. This is marked in pink on the sketch map. The line of the border once it turned SW towards Turba was of little interest to either party. The only area of dispute was that immediately West of Mudariba, the Turks claiming the boundary should be the loop marked in green.

The original British intention had been to stand out for the border to follow the line marked in blue, which was the border of the Subaihi tribal area. Unfortunately some years earlier, to counter French designs on Sheikh Syed, it had been put in writing that Sheikh Syed was Turkish, hence the border marked in yellow!

The British eventually made a concession as regards the line of the border for the last couple of miles or so before it reached the sea. By having it finish at Murad it put a couple of wells on the Turkish side of the border. The first two or three boundary pillars in from the sea could be seen from Perim.

This map shows very clearly the kink in the boundary that was necessary to put a group of wells inside Turkish territory, following discussions some while after the two Commissions had left the field. Having reached Trig Point 526 on a compass bearing from Jebel Kabub, it was agreed that the boundary would reach the sea at Jebel Murad. Some of the whitewashed boundary posts near the sea were clearly visible from the Assistant Resident’s quarters when these were part of the lighthouse complex (See Perim in 1906). Distances can be judged by comparing them to the Narrow Strait, which was about two and a half miles wide.

A portion of a 1904 sketch in the National Archives

Scale: Turam to Mudariba 18 miles. Mudariba to Mufalis 27 miles

When the Turkish Commission ‘called it a day’ on 29 April, the boundary had been agreed as far as Mudariba (where the line in pink finishes) and near where the Joint Commission was camped. The area immediately to the west of Mudariba was in dispute, the Turks insisting the border should follow the line in green. The blue line was the western limit of Subaihi territory and when the impasse was reached this was the border Fitzmaurice suggested the British should now claim. With this still a possibility the Britsh survey parties surveyed the blue line and by the end of May had completed it, i.e. as far as Akama and Akkar and down to the sea at Dabab. Meanwhile it had dawned on the Bombay government that some years previously, to prevent the French establishing a post there, Britain had recognised Sheikh Syed as being in Turkish territory! This would lead to the border eventually agreed upon being the yellow and black line, evidently based on compass bearings from one jebel to another, until the area close to Sheikh Syed was reached.

[Unfortunately the colours used (pink, blue, green and yellow & black) are not the same as those mentioned in the text. The text mentions that the Turks were insisting on a ‘red’ line which was different from Wahab’s ‘purple’ line. I have always assumed that the ‘red’ line was only that portion marked in green on the sketch, whilst the ‘purple’ line was just the bit until it met up with the green line near Karba. A bit complicated!]