ASSAULT LANDING AT SHEIKH SYED

War was declared with Turkey on 31 October 1914. This event had been foreseen for some while and from early that month it had been decided to send reinforcements urgently from India to Egypt. One of the 20 battalions earmarked for Egypt, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers, was re-tasked to go to Aden which had also asked for reinforcements. In spite of its name this was an infantry battalion, but with training as assault pioneers. It will be referred to as the ‘1/23rd’. As a result, on 30 October, the QMG in India ordered the Embarkation Commandant to embark the 1/23rd on a fast single-battalion transport.

One of the formations being sent to Egypt was the 11th Indian Division; one of its brigades was the 30th commanded by Brigadier General H V Cox. The three infantry battalions in his brigade were the 14th Sikhs and the 69th and 89th Punjabis.

In mid-October Turkish forces had been reported to be assembling in some strength on the borders of the Aden Protectorate. In particular their presence at Sheikh Syed immediately opposite Perim was deemed to be a serious threat. A strategic weakness of Perim as a coaling station was its proximity to the Turkish-held mainland which put the island and port within range of any but the lightest of artillery pieces and made an assault landing mounted from Sheikh Syed a distinct possibility.

The decision was therefore taken to mount a preemptive attack against Fort Turba, the same fort that had been shelled two years previously by the Italian cruiser Calabria and other vessels during the Italo-Turkish war. The first indication in Aden that something might be afoot was on 23 October when the CGS in India asked GOC Aden for information regarding landing places at Sheikh Syed.

The decision to attack Sheikh Syed was a military and not a political one, and taken in India. It is not known if the Viceroy was briefed as to what was planned, but certainly a conscious decision was taken not to tell the Secretary of State for India in Whitehall. His first knowledge of the landing was to be the report sent on its completion. In addition the Aden Residency was not consulted as to the political implications and the effect that such a landing might have on the local tribes.

After the operation had been completed the authorities in Aden would make plain their view that the landing had been counter productive as it had antagonised the local rulers and also might provoke the Turks into taking offensive action against Aden itself (which they did in July the following year). However considerable imagination and flexibility were shown in the planning and mounting of this operation as it was decided to mount an assault landing to spike the guns in the fort rather than trying to knock them out by naval gunfire. It is probably the first example in modern warfare of an opposed assault landing.

It was decided to use elements of what was about to be one large convoy carrying the 11th Division to Egypt. The urgency of reinforcing Egypt was such that the whole operation had to be completed in not more than 36 hours. On the evening of 4 November the two convoys carrying the 11th Division received a coded signal from the CGS in India that Sheikh Syed was to be captured and the fortifications and its guns there be destroyed and the wells put out of use.

General Cox’s brigade, reinforced by the 1/23rd, was to be used for the operation. The signal was also sent to Aden where Major Bradshaw, the GSO Aden (the equivalent of brigade major) was to be ordered by GOC Aden (Major General Shaw, newly arrived) to join Cox as the convoy passed Aden. Major Bradshaw was to bring maps, local information and a plan of attack which he would then submit to Cox for approval. To try to prevent information of the impending operation ‘getting into the bazaar’ only Bell and Bradshaw were to know what was planned.

The Admiral in India was asked (he could not be ordered) to provide ‘naval cooperation’, in modern parlance naval gunfire support. His initial response was very unhelpful: he could not afford to provide a warship for this as there was only one escorting the convoy. But he should have realised that the following day the convoy from Madras was due to meet up with another convoy from Bombay, and this also had an escort. On 5 November the Admiral was asked to reconsider his decision. A compromise was reached when it was agreed that the main body of the convoy would anchor off Aden whilst HMS Duke of Edinburgh and three transports went ahead to Perim and Sheikh Syed. The combined convoy comprised the two large warship escorts and 37 transports, plus one ship of the Indian Marine.

HMS Duke of Edinburgh

On 6 November Brigadier General Cox transferred to the fastest of the three transports so that he could sail on ahead of the convoy and be briefed by Major Bradshaw. His ship anchored in Aden Outer Harbour early evening on the 8th, when Major Bradshaw went aboard. When the orders had been sent to the convoys they had also been passed to the GOC in Aden.

On the 4th Shaw had made a strong recommendation to India that Cox should be accompanied to Sheikh Syed by a selected Political Officer (presumably this would have been Lieutenant Colonel Jacob, Shaw’s 1st Assistant) so that the local tribes could be reassured of British intentions. Since no reply seems to have been sent to this request, Shaw presumably had little option but to obey the order he had been given, that only Major Bradshaw should be told of what was planned. As a result no political officer accompanied Bradshaw when he went aboard Cox’s transport.

Cox himself went aboard the Duke of Edinburgh when she arrived at 10 the following morning, in order to coordinate the naval plan with her captain, Captain Blackett RN. Cox then returned to his ship to give out his orders to his battalion commanders. HMS Duke of Edinburgh and the three transports then sailed at 1700 hrs for Sheikh Syed. The task force anchored off Fort Turba early hrs on the 10th, but at 0300 hrs the decision was taken that the weather would prevent a landing on the beaches originally selected, which were well away from the fort. The new area was under the guns of the fort, so at first light it was bombarded for an hour and a half by the Duke of Edinburgh.

The Turkish guns there consisted of two 6-in Krupp and four field guns and the Krupp guns are recorded as having returned the fire, albeit without effect. Two hours later the two Punjabi battalions started to land in the sheltered bay directly under the guns of the fort. The landing was made in the face of small-arms fire but, under covering fire from the Duke of Edinburgh, resistance was soon overcome and the fort and surrounding high ground captured.

The boats used to land the assaulting infantry were towed to the shore by three tugs, two of which had been commandeered from the Perim Coal Company. The third had been brought from Aden. In his initial report Cox gave five reasons for the landing having been greatly delayed: strong winds, leaky transport boats, unsatisfactory tugs, shallow water and heavy shrapnel fire. As a result only one and a half battalions were put ashore in the first four hours; casualties were light, four killed and 16 wounded. Altogether 3,000 men were landed. Demolition parties from the 1/23rd went ashore to deal with the guns and ammunition.

The two Krupp and the four field guns were destroyed together with a large quantity of shells and cordite and 100,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. The 1/23rd were re-embarked by 1500 hrs on the 11th and sailed for Aden, taking with them Major Bradshaw. By 1800 hrs the whole force was back aboard the transports which then rejoined HMS Swiftsure and the remainder of the convoy to continue to Egypt.