CONTINGENCY PLAN

CONTINGENCY PLAN 1895-1911

In the years leading up to the Great War a certain amount of contingency planning had taken place in Aden prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. When writing the Defence Scheme for Aden in 1895, Brigadier General Jopp, the Resident, had appreciated that the existence of the coaling station on Perim had to be taken into consideration. According to his information anything from 10,000 to 20,000 tons of coal was normally stored there. Jopp wrote a contingency plan in case the Senior Naval Officer (SNO) considered that this quantity would at the time be considered a potential source of danger and would recommend that the stock should be reduced or destroyed. The SNO was not ‘under command’ of the Resident – hence he always had to be asked rather than ordered.

The plan was for all British merchant ships in Aden harbour to be taken up from trade and sent to Perim with large gangs of Arab coolies aboard. These would load up as much coal as they could and return to Aden. If time permitted ships would return to Perim for another load. In the meantime the coolie gangs of the Perim Coal Company, working under the orders of the Assistant Resident there, would jettison as much coal as possible into about two to three fathoms of water. Any stacks of coal not thus recovered or jettisoned would have to be fired. It was estimated that 500 coolies would take five days to jettison 10,000 tons of coal into Perim harbour. Since the 300 to 400 coolies normally employed on Perim could be easily reinforced by 1,000 coolies sent from Aden, Jopp estimated that one way or another all stocks could be removed or neutralised in a couple of days. As an alternative to firing any stacks that could not be removed in time, he thought an even better idea might be to scatter the stacks using explosives.

Aden’s Defence Scheme was updated in 1901. The revised plan for Perim was simple: the detachment would be evacuated. The reason given was that Aden would need all the men it could muster. Therefore following a declaration of war or the outbreak of hostilities the detachment on Perim would be brought into fortress Aden. This would mean that no attempt could be made to defend the coal stocks in the manner that had been suggested in the Colonial Office circular of November 1886 entitled ‘Local Preparations to be made in anticipation of war’. Furthermore, in accordance with the principles laid down in the circular, the coal stocks would not be in any way interfered with by the General Officer commanding fortress Aden. Or in other words defence or destruction of coal stocks was a naval responsibility.

The threat to Aden (and presumably also to Perim) in 1907 was assessed as being an attack by up to four enemy cruisers. Perim was not mentioned specifically in the contingency plans published that year, but in the revised plans published in February 1909 Perim was still to be evacuated. The action to be taken by the Assistant Resident Perim at any time during transition to war, on receipt of the appropriate order from the GOC Aden Brigade (i.e. the Resident) was to be as follows: He was to assemble all the personnel of the Perim Coal Company, the detachment, those employed by government and any other individuals who wished to leave Perim He was then to load all lighters with such valuable articles as he deemed it advisable to remove and take all the above to Aden, using all steamers, tugs and launches that might be in harbour at the time.

As things turned out the 1907 assessment would not be too wide of the mark as in August 1914 the German China Squadron would include four cruisers of varying sizes. On 12 August the squadron would concentrate at Pagan Bay in the Mariannas to decide on a plan of action. The German admiral considered taking his squadron (which also included two battlecruisers) into the Indian Ocean but opted for the Pacific as the difficulties of coaling his squadron in the former would be too difficult.

At the Mariannas conference it would be decided to send only one light cruiser, the Emden, into the Indian Ocean. A deployment of this nature had been foreseen by Aden. In 1911 a major revision was made to the Aden Defence Scheme, and particularly with regard to the defence of Perim. The likely threat was reduced to that of a passing cruiser wishing to destroy the cable buildings and instruments and the shore ends of the cable and to make free use of the coaling facilities. Since the destruction of the cable station could only be accomplished by a landing in boats from the cruiser it was felt that the garrison could formidably oppose this by manning carefully selected and concealed positions.

Therefore, with the threat reduced from four cruisers to one, it was laid down in the revised Scheme that the garrison on Perim would now only be withdrawn on mobilisation if the GOC, after consultation with the SNO, considered it absolutely necessary. This again would turn out to be an accurate assessment, seeing that the Emden would be cornered off the Cocos Keeling Islands on 9 November 1914 whilst destroying the cable and wireless stations there.

In previous threat assessments it had always been the coal stocks, and their use to a potential enemy, that had been given any consideration. It was only in 1911 that the primary importance of the cable station was fully appreciated. For the links in use in 1911 see Eastern Telegraph Co.

In the 1911 Defence Scheme for Aden and Perim no thought had been given to a possible threat from Turkish forces in the Yemen. For the former this omission of a landward threat could have been as disastrous in 1915 as it was to be for Singapore only some 26 years later. As far as Perim was concerned a Turkish attack would entail troops crossing the Narrow Strait; but a garrison equal to a weak platoon would have been quite unable to defend the island. The 1911 Scheme was the last update prior to war being declared